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Recent surveys have found that Afro-Venezuelans vote disproportionately 
for Hugo Chávez as President. This paper seeks to explain why Chávez has 
received significant support from non-white voters.  I argue that this support is 
not only due to his mixed racial background, but more importantly due to the 
tangible benefits from the Chávez regime in the form of policies directed 
specifically at redressing racial discrimination and class inequalities.  These 
policies include legislation against racial discrimination, educational reform, the 
mass enfranchisement of Afro-Venezuelan voters, and the recruitment of Afro-
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What has led to the support in Venezuela of Hugo Chávez as President?  More 
specifically, what role if any, have Afro-Venezuelans played in Hugo Chávez’s 
electoral victories?  This research seeks to address whether or not race/ethnicity 
has been a key contributing factor to the electoral success of Chávez.   If 
race/ethnicity has a significant relationship with the electoral success of Chávez it 
will be important for scholars in the field of political science to note this 
relationship in order to understand how future leaders may or may not mobilize 
voters based on race/ethnicity in Venezuela and Latin America more generally.  
For example, if Hugo Chávez has been able to garner support from non-white 
populations including Afro-Venezuelans,  future leaders may also be able to 
assemble winning coalitions based on race or ethnicity to the same extent in 
future elections.  Also, it will be an interesting point of analysis to determine 
whether future leaders will be more or less likely to highlight certain issues of 
race/ethnicity in order to gain electoral support. 
 The previous literature that has addressed the question of how Chávez 
has continuously gained electoral support in Venezuela has proposed a variety 
of explanations but it largely ignores the possibility that electoral support for the 
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president has been based on issues of race/ethnicity.  Firstly, it has been argued 
that many citizens were disappointed with the past democratic system and this 
led to the widespread support for a radical leader who proposed to remedy the 
failures of the past.  Secondly, there has been a tendency to focus on institutional 
and elite based factors that have led to the rise of Chávez as president. For 
example, the political party system of the past did not adequately address the 
needs of the public.  Additionally, the revolutionary leader’s rise to power might 
not have happened if President Caldera had not decided to release Chávez from 
prison in 1994.  Thirdly, it has been argued that Chávez’s economic policies and 
ideology appeal mostly to those of lower economic classes and that because of 
this those that are poorer are most likely to support the president.  Fourthly, the 
retrospective economic voting theory argues that retrospective evaluations about 
the national economy have determined the vote for or against Chávez as 
president.  Additionally, it has been argued that the president’s rhetoric and 
charisma has led to the widespread support among Venezuelans for Chávez as 
president.  However, race/ethnicity has not been systematically analyzed in 
terms of its effect on electoral support for Chávez as president. 
 I argue that race/ethnicity has in fact had an effect on the electoral support 
of Chávez as President.  More specifically, I argue that Afro-Venezuelans have 
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supported the president due to his empathy with the Afro-Venezuelan 
population, the president’s racially-oriented discourse, his racially oriented 
policies, and his redistributive policies.  I use a survey that Latin American 
Public Opinion Project conducted in 2007 to test whether or not Afro-
Venezuelans have supported Chávez disproportionately compared to other 
racial/ethnic groups. For this research, I also conducted informal interviews with 
prominent Afro-Venezuelans leaders including congressmen and the vice-
president of the National Assembly, and carried out an informal survey of a 
convenience sample of citizens conducted in the capital city, Caracas.  Before 
discussing the results of my analysis it is important to note the racial/ethnic 
demographics of Venezuela.  According to one source, 68% of the population 
being mestizo (mixed Amerindian and European), 21% white, 10% African, and 
1% indigenous (Library of Congress Country Studies 1990).  While Chávez is of 
mixed ancestry (African, Indigenous, and Spanish), his background largely 
represents the majority of Venezuelans.  The results of my quantitative analysis 
demonstrate that race/ethnicity is in fact significantly related to support for 
Chávez as president.  More specifically, those that self-identify as being of 
African descent are more likely to support Chávez, while those that self-identify 
as white or mestizo are less likely to support the president. 
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Venezuela has a long history of racial inequality and discrimination.  
Many Venezuelans believe that they live in a racial democracy but scholarly 
research demonstrates that social and economic disparities in Venezuela and 
Latin America more generally are in fact highly racialized (Hoffman, Centeno 
2003, 364). While Venezuela does not adhere to the specific definitions of race as 
in the United States, racist ideology may be observed throughout the society.   
Throughout the present century, most Venezuelans have denied that they had a 
racial problem, especially one like that of the United States, with its 
segregationist practices.  But nevertheless, they placed blacks in an inferior social 
position.  In their minds they (have) a chromatic scale that linked dark skin and 
African characteristics with lower-class status (Wright 1990, 5).  
 
Chávez has addressed issues of race that previous political leaders have 
ignored.  He has addressed these issues of race not only in his use of racial 
rhetoric, but also in the form of policies directed specifically at redressing racial 
discrimination.  These policies have included the recruitment of Afro-
Venezuelan leaders, legislation against racial discrimination, educational reform, 
and voter registration reform that has led to the mass enfranchisement of Afro-
Venezuelan voters and political leaders within the Chávez administration 
(Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 1, 2011).   
 In this paper I will first discuss the previous literature on what has led to 
the electoral success of Chávez as president.  I will then address how 
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race/ethnicity in Venezuela has had an effect on the electoral success of Chávez.  
This explanation will include a historical analysis of race in Venezuela.  Next, I 
will discuss how Chávez has addressed issues of race that previous leaders have 
ignored.  Subsequently, I will present the statistical results for this research.  
Lastly, I will present my conclusions and the implications this research has for 






Disenchantment with Democracy 
 
The first argument in the literature that seeks to explain the widespread support 
for Hugo Chávez as president is based on the failure of the past democratic 
system.  The Punto Fijo system of the past consisted of two alternating political 
parties; however, this system of democracy failed due to its exclusion of the 
masses.  According to Ellner and Hellinger: 
Bolivarianism was a response to disillusionment with the efficacy of that project, 
and it succeeded in sweeping away much of the old regime.  Hugo Chávez 
capitalized on the profound mistrust and anger directed toward those associated 
with the old regime and the sense of Venezuela’s poor majority that he is one of 
their own (Ellner and Hellinger 2003, 52). 
 
Furthermore, in order to understand the crisis of democratic legitimacy in 
Venezuela, the issue of political corruption must also be analyzed (Rey in 
Canache and Kulisheck 1998, 113).  As Canache and Kulisheck point out, 
“(c)orruption was allegedly, the principal reason for the two attempted military 
coups d’etat on 4 February and 27 November 1992” (113). 
The widespread loss of faith in the past democratic system engendered 
political instability and violence that allowed for the rise of Chávez (Ellner 2002, 
181).  Canache, for example, explains that he was able to capture growing 
support between 1992 and 1998 due to his previous attempt to topple the past 
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democratic system.  Her findings suggest that Chávez constructed his electoral 
coalition among Venezuelans who believed that he no longer represented a 
threat to democracy, and among those who were ambivalent towards 
democracy.   
However, it is imperative to analyze support for Chávez at the level of the 
masses in order to understand why the current leader has been successful.  
According to Canache, “(i)nstitutional and elite level factors may explain why 
the traditional parties failed in 1998, but do not explain why Chávez won the 
presidential election…it remains plausible that voters could have rejected the 
former coup leader….to ascertain why they did we must focus attention at the 
mass level” (Canache 2002, 72).  In other words, we must analyze public opinion 
and electoral support more closely in order to understand the basis for his 




Some political scientists have made the argument that Venezuela’s political 
institutions allowed for the rise of Chávez as President.  McCoy and Myers, for 
example, argue in their edited volume that “(u)nderstanding what happened to 
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the party system after 1993 is especially important for identifying how and why 
Hugo Chávez Frias’s Bolivarian Revolution triumphed…” (McCoy and Myers 
2004, 152).  The past democratic system of the alternating political parties Acción 
Democrática (Democratic Action) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral 
Independiente (Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee) led to 
widespread disillusionment with democracy among Venezuelan citizens.  
According to Crisp: 
To understand how Venezuela could move from the epitome of political stability 
to become one of the region’s most threatened democracies, we must focus on 
the particular nature of the democratic institutions of Venezuela…these same 
institutional features explain the political crisis because they failed to evolve to 
reflect new social and economic realities(Crisp 2000, 4). 
 
The inability of Venezuela’s democratic system to preserve the rule of law 
and to honor principles of citizenship made it possible for Chávez and other 
leaders to interpret these policy failures as manifestations of a struggle between 
the people versus the elite (Hawkins 2010, 93).  Additionally, Leonardo Vivas 
argues that elite decisions gave Chávez the opportunity to rise to power.  This 
includes, for example, Caldera’s decision to release Chávez from prison in 1994, 
and the poor campaign tactics of Saez and Romer (Cited in Canache 2002, 72).   
Additionally, Vivas argues that Chávez’s victory was due to the struggle for 
power among economic elites and their political allies, and that the leader’s 
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formation of an alliance of military and civilian actors opposed to the established 
political system provided an ample resource of support for Chávez (72).  While 
these authors adequately address factors at the elite and institutional level, the 
issue of race and its effect on the opportunity for Chávez to rise to power is not 






Third, the vote for Hugo Chávez as president has been attributed to a class 
struggle with members of the poorer classes being more likely to support the 
president while those who come from  a more privileged economic status being 
more likely to oppose him.  For example, Canache argues in her 2004 chapter 
titled “Urban Poor and Political Order” that the urban poor are the sector of the 
population that is most likely to support Chávez (McCoy and Myers 2004).  She 
explains that because poorer individuals were more vulnerable to the economic 
crises of the 1980s and 1990s that they were more likely to support the radical 
economic and political policies that were proposed by Chávez.  
In his article, “Who Votes for Chavismo?: Class Voting in Hugo Chávez’s 
Venezuela” Lupu clears up the class argument by distinguishing between 
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monotonic and non-monotonic associations between class and vote choice. He 
finds that only in 1998 was class background directly correlated with support for 
Chávez  (Lupu 2010,  7).  After 1998, class voting became non-monotonic because 
support increased mostly among the middle class and not the poor (7).  While 
these scholars critically examine issues of class, race is not factored into any of 




Retrospective Economic Voting 
 
 
The argument has also been made that retrospective evaluations about the 
national economy have determined the vote for or against Chávez as president.  
In his article, “Economic Voting Reconsidered: Crisis and Charisma in the 
Election of Hugo Chávez” Kurt Weyland finds that those who had a negative 
retrospective assessment of the economy at the national level were most likely to 
vote for Chávez as President.  By contrast, those who had a positive retrospective 
economic assessment at the personal level were more likely to support Chávez’s 
main opponent, Salas Romer.  This argument implies that those who supported 
Romer were those receiving personal benefits from the past regime.  At the same 
time, national economic assessments are more important than personal economic 
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assessments for those who support Chávez.  All in all, economic assessments 
have a significant impact on the electoral preference for or against Chávez.   
 
Rhetoric and Charisma 
 
The continued electoral success of Chávez has also been attributed to his popular 
and charismatic characteristics.  José Luis Uzcategui characterizes Chávez as a 
“magician of emotions’ using a combination of psychological and sociological 
elements that created a political climate favorable to the diffusion and reception 
of the message of the young, charismatic leader…Chávez tapped into emotions, 
expectations, illusions, fears, doubts, and worries in a population profoundly 
disenchanted with the existing regime” (Uzcategui in Canache 2002, 71).  In other 
words, Chávez’s persuasive rhetoric has proven to be a powerful means of 
retaining electoral support and a positive mass public opinion. This Chávez 
phenomenon has been widely labeled by political scientists as pure populism.   
Populism is defined by some as a “charismatic mode of linkage between 
voters and politicians, a relationship largely unmediated by any institutionalized 
party, and that it bases itself on a powerful Manichaean discourse of ‘the people 
versus the elite’ “(Hawkins 2010, 1137).  In his article, “Venezuela’s Chavismo 
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and Populism in Comparative Perspective” Hawkins argues that the populist 
tendencies of Chavismo have encouraged an ‘anything goes’ attitude among 
Chávez’s supporters and that this has led to his continued electoral success 
(Hawkins 2010, 1137).   In other words, because of his appealing personality, 
there is no effective system to check the power of the president because the 
citizens like him too much to criticize his government. 
 
Race and Support for Chávez 
There are ample reasons to suspect that racial voting may have played a role in 
the rise of Hugo Chávez, given that the political history of Venezuela includes 
the political and economic marginalization of non-white populations.  Precious 
little work been done on race and its effect on electoral support in Venezuela, but 
Barry Cannon did address this issue in his working paper “Class/race polarisation 
in Venezuela and the electoral success of Hugo Chávez: a break with the past or the song 
remains the same?” He argues that “race is an important subtext to (the) class 
based support, and that there is indeed a correlation between class and race 
within the Venezuelan context” (Cannon 2008, 2).  While Chávez has utilized 
elements of class and race in his rhetoric appeal to the masses, the opposition has 
used these elements negatively (Cannon 2008, 2).  The racial rhetoric of the 
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president has been bold due to “his aware (ness) of economic exploitation and 
racial discrimination” (Kozloff 2005, 2).  He has also pursued a connection with 
poor communities of color in the United States by providing financial assistance 
to the mostly poor and African-American victims of Hurricane Katrina (Kozloff 
2005, 1).   
The political and economic divide in Venezuela based on skin color was 
largely evident during the demonstrations both for and against Chávez in the 
days before the coup in 2002 (2005, 2).  However, overall, racial/ethnic identity 
and its effect on electoral support in Venezuela have largely been understudied 
in the field of political science. I argue that because of his racial background and 
personal experience with racism, Chávez has brought previously ignored issues 











History of Race Relations in Venezuela 
Contrary to the popular belief that there is racial “democracy” or equal 
opportunity in Latin America, Venezuela has been plagued by the residual 
effects of colonialism and slavery.  The myth of racial democracy, however, has 
been used to deny and diminish the violent characteristics of racism in 
Venezuela.  It has had the deleterious effect of convincing individuals into 
honestly believing that there are no discriminatory and/or violent conflicts of 
race in Venezuela (Garcia n.d., 36).  “This ideology views the European as ‘the 
civilizing agent, (and) makes those of African and indigenous descent largely 
invisible” (Cannon 2008-2009, 28).   
In order to understand the relationship between race and class in Latin 
America the historical context must be analyzed.  The historical legacy of the 
economic marginalization of Afro-descendants is largely due to the colonial 
project of slavery.  White settlers in Latin America “seized the land of the 
indigenous peoples, and they appropriated the labour of the black slaves that 
they had imported.  Additionally, at the end of slavery, 60 per cent of 
Venezuelans had African origins… (Cannon 2008-2009, 10). 
In his working paper, Cannon explains that the white Latin American elite 
had “a deep mistrust of native and African conceptions of community and 
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society” (2008-2009, 10). Because of this, Latin American politicians had more in 
common with the elites of the United States and Europe than their fellow Latin 
Americans (Cannon 2008-09, 10).  Furthermore, white elites expressed an 
“ingrained racist fear and hatred’ that was “alarmed by the continuing presence 
of the expropriated underclass…” (Cannon 2008-09, 10). 
The white settler minority in Latin America has also promulgated the false 
ideology that racism does not exist in order to dilute and eventually expel the 
non-white majority (Nascimento 1989, 8).  For example, in 1944, the poet 
politician Andrés Eloy Blanco wrote a column in the partisan El País in which he 
compared race in Venezuela to “café con leche” (Wright 1990, 1). He did so in 
response to the Brazilian government’s strategy of solving the “Negro problem” 
by offering stipends to whites and European immigrants who married blacks.  In 
comparison to the U.S., Blanco stated that, “That is how it is, dear professor, with 
the question of your blacks. In my humble opinion, you have never known how 
to treat coffee or Negroes. The former you leave too light, the latter too black” (1).  
He concluded: “Therefore, if it is proven that America ought to be white, I prefer 
our method of roasting coffee. And our form of preparing café con leche.  It will 
prove a bit slower, but it is better” (1).   
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This citation clearly highlights the distinct characteristic of racist ideology 
in Latin America and its attempt to extinguish darker races.  The strategies used 
to repress blacks in Latin America have included forced miscegenation, color 
prejudice, racial discrimination, and immigration policy designed for the specific 
purpose of whitening the country and taking the means of survival away from 
Africans (Nascimento 1989, 8). These strategies slowly led the Caracas based 
elites who ruled most of Venezuela to agree that they could indeed improve their 
nation's population by whitening” (Wright 1990, 43).  
Winthrop Wright’s book titled Café con Leche: Race, class, and national image 
in Venezuela, sheds light on the history of racist ideology in Venezuela.  He 
demonstrates that the “official doctrine of nondiscrimination and lack of 
prejudice have permeated all levels of Venezuelan thinking on the subject” 
(Wright 1990, 127).  In contrast to race relations in the U.S. where a drop of black 
blood makes an individual black from the viewpoint of the dominant white 
group, Venezuelans only consider those with very dark skin and African features 
as black (Wright 1990, 3).  Additionally, those that are mixed and that have 
lighter skin are more socially acceptable. Wright explains that “elites rewarded 
such individuals by bestowing upon them the advantages that accrued from 
whiteness and penalized nonwhites for their blackness” (Wright 1990, 3).  
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Another example of the state’s racist ideology includes its endorsement of 
European immigration after slavery rather than creating policies to alleviate the 
social and economic inequality of blacks after the abolition of slavery.  After the 
abolishment of slavery, blacks continued to live with the effects of slavery.    
Additionally, in the 1950’s Marcos Perez Jimenez included in his Plan for 
the Nation “an official plan for ‘whitening’ the population.  As he pointed out in 
his own words: 
Within the big ideas of the national ideal it has been said, with full knowledge, 
that it is necessary to improve the…ethnic component.  We have a number of 
physical and hereditary defects that must be corrected (…)  Therefore, among the 
questions of the New National Ideal, the first necessity is to mix our race with 
European peoples, (…) looking for  a selective immigration, in simpler words, we 
want the very best we can find” (1).  
  
Leaders such as Jimenez have encouraged European immigration and the 
eradication of the African and indigenous populations.  This historical and 
anecdotal evidence substantiates the claim that the Venezuelan elite have 
implemented and enforced racist ideology.   In reality, the legacy of colonialism 
has remained in Venezuela.  Contrary to the mainstream belief that Venezuela is 
a mixed racial democracy, the general quality of life for African descendants in 
Venezuela reflects their unequal status in the nation’s democratic processes, 
economic, health and education programs (33).  
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Chávez’s Response to Race and Racism in Venezuela 
Unlike previous political leaders in Venezuela, Chávez has highlighted issues of 
race.  I propose Afro-Venezuelans have voted for Chávez because of his racial 
background, his racially-oriented policies, but also because of his class-oriented 
policies.   
 
Chávez's Mixed Racial Background  
Hugo Chávez's mixed racial/ethnic ancestry is one of the primary reasons that 
Afro-Venezuelans have demonstrated a disproportionate amount of electoral 
support for him as president compared to other racial/ethnic groups.   As a result 
of the president’s own experience with anti-black racism he has demonstrated 
empathy towards the Afro-Venezuelan community by utilizing positive racial 
rhetoric and by also implementing policies against racial discrimination. We 
would expect that because Chávez is sensitive to these issues and therefore 
willing to address issues of race, the Afro-Venezuelan population would 
demonstrate an overwhelming support for the president.   
The racial discrimination that the president has personally endured has 
encouraged him to empathize with non-white populations including indigenous 
and Afro-Venezuelan citizens.  To cite just one example: 
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President Chávez’s invitation to the TransAfrica Forum of Washington,DC, USA 
to visit Venezuela in January 2004 to commemorate Martin Luther King, Jr….was 
a flash point for the President’s opponents and for racist commentary throughout 
mainstream press (Garcia n.d., 36).   
 
This racial hostility is not exceptional as President Chávez has frequently 
endured racial commentary that either overtly or inadvertently refers to his 
mixed ancestry (36).  The president’s tendency to be empathetic toward non-
white populations might lead Afro-Venezuelans to be more likely than whites to 
vote for Chávez as president.  This should also lead key social movements such 
as the Afro-Venezuelan Network to seek political, social, and economic redress 
from the government.   
 Many have observed the racial differences between those who support 
Chávez versus those who are against the current regime.   Skin color seems to be 
a dividing factor in the demonstrations both for and against Chávez.“The 
Venezuelan TV media, which is dominated by whites or light skinned 
individuals, and which relegates black or dark-skinned people to play roles as 
criminals or servants in soap operas” has continuously aired anti-Chávez 
propaganda (Kozloff 3). 
The majority of Venezuelans support Chávez based in part on the fact that 
he is also from a poor background and pardo (of mixed Indigenous, African and 
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European descent) like the majority of Venezuelans (Cannon 2008-9, 7).  Most 
individuals who dislike the president are those of the middle and mostly upper 
classes and who reject those who are poor and darker skinned (7). Afro-
Venezuelan organizations have been fighting against the historical 
marginalization of non-whites, and blacks in particular.  Jesus Chucho Garcia, 
leader and founder of the Afro-Venezuelan network explains that while there is 
in fact a fight between classes, there is also a cultural fight against the belief that 
‘whiter’ is better” (Garcia n.d., 36).   
In an article published by the Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela to the United States, the specifics of Chávez’s ethnic/racial 
background is discussed.  Hugo Chávez is the first president in Venezuela’s 
history to publicly recognize his indigenous and African ancestry (Embassy of 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2011, 2).  In an 
interview with Amy Goodman in 2005, President Chávez said “(h)ate against me 
has a lot to do with racism.  Because of my big mouth, because of my curly hair.  
And I’m so proud to have this mouth and this hair, because it’s African” 
(Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2).   
Electoral support among the Afro-Venezuelan population may be due in 
part to Chávez’s empathy toward the black and indigenous populations.  Many 
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blacks have found the Chávez government to be more empathetic to the needs of 
the population than opposing parties.  While the legacy of racism and 
discrimination against Afro-descendants has not been completely resolved, the 
Chávez government “has started working with the Afro-Venezuela community 
and has taken some important steps to recognize and correct it” (Embassy of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2011, 3).  
 
Racially-Oriented Policies  
I argue that if in fact Afro-Venezuelans support Chávez disproportionately 
compared to other groups this support may not only be due to his ancestry and 
appearance, but more importantly due to the tangible benefits they have received 
from the Chávez regime in the form of policies directed specifically at redressing 
racial inequalities.  These policies include legislation against racial 
discrimination, educational reform, and the mass enfranchisement of Afro-
Venezuelan voters and the recruitment of Afro-Venezuelan political leaders 
within the Chávez administration.  The legislation against racial discrimination 
includes the 2005 presidential decree that approved the Presidential Commission 
for the Prevention and Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination in the 
Venezuelan Educational System (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of 
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Venezuela to the United States 2011, 1).  The mass enfranchisement of Afro-
Venezuelan voters is due to Article 56 of the 1999 Constitution that guarantees 
rights for all citizens to have free registration with the Civil Registry Office 
((Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2011, 1). 
This section seeks to explain how these policies have been aimed at specifically 
addressing the social, political, and economic needs of the Afro-Venezuelan 
population.   
After the election of Hugo Chávez as president a new constitution was 
established.  As stated previously, Article 56 of the 1999 Constitution has 
guaranteed all persons the right to free registration with the Civil Registry Office 
(2).  Furthermore, this article has led to an increased level of registration among 
Afro-Venezuelans and the opportunity for more Afro-Venezuelans to participate 
electorally (2).   In their article “Afro-Venezuelans And The Struggle Against 
Racism,” The Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United 
States explains that: 
Since 2003, millions of Afro-Venezuelans have been issued national ID cards 
guaranteeing them the right to free registration with the Civil Registry Office. 
Afro-Venezuelans have exercised their right to vote as well as to run for political 
office in unprecedented numbers over the course of the 16 elections that have 
taken place in Venezuela since 1998 (2).   
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In the Chávez administration, Afro-Venezuelans now occupy important posts as 
legislators, ambassadors, and assemblymen.  For example, Aristobulo Isturiz is 
the first black person to be, vice-president of the National Assembly (2).  
Evidence from my field research also suggests that Afro-Venezuelans 
disproportionately support Hugo Chávez as President due to the racially 
oriented policies of the president.  This research included meetings with leaders 
of La Red de Organizaciones Afrodescendientes (The Afro-Venezuelan 
Network), and prominent black political leaders including congressmen and the 
vice-president of the National Assembly.  These leaders all stated that previous 
to the Chávez government they would not have held these positions because of 
their skin color. Furthermore, they expressed strong support for Hugo Chávez as 
President.   
While some admitted that the black movement does not support 
everything that the president has done and that the Revolution has just started 
they still support him in general and would not vote for any other candidate as 
president. Furthermore, they explained that there has been more political 
inclusion for non-whites. More specifically, Afro-Venezuelan political leaders 
now have access to Miraflores, the presidential palace which allows them to 
participate in the law-making processes.  Congressman Modesto Ruiz, the author 
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of the recent law against racial discrimination, explained that recent measures of 
the administration are aimed at reversing past efforts to eradicate African and 
indigenous culture from the national culture.   
The current level of political and social inclusion of Afro-descendants has 
led to a new pattern of influence and political inclusion in Venezuela (Garcia 
n.d., 32).  In his essay “The Political Status of Afro-Venezuelans in the Bolivarian 
Revolution” Jesus Chucho Garcia, the founder of La Red AfroVenezolano, states 
that  
The emergence of Afro-Venezuelans into national and international public 
spheres is primarily related to decades of hard work at the margins of 
Venezuelan society…The dramatically unfolding Bolivarian Revolution under 
the commanding and controversial leadership of the energetic and charismatic 
Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela has certainly helped Afro-Venezuelans to 
amplify, although not formally position, their demands for full inclusion in 
national development in the nation’s consciousness…Hugo Chávez’s strong 
leadership and the stated participatory democracy programs of the Bolivarian 
Revolution could, if fully and broadly enacted in collaboration with Afro-
Venezuelans, achieve unprecedented progress (Garcia n.d., 32). 
 
In addition to the increase in political participation and inclusion due to 
the constitutional reformation of 1999, Venezuela’s 2011 Census will include for 
the first time a question that allows individuals to identify themselves as being 
Afro-descendant (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United 
States 2011, 2).  “This move came at the behest of social organizations fighting for 
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the explicit recognition of the Afro-descendent population in Venezuela” and 
will allow the Venezuelan government to recognize its diversity and respond 
accordingly to the specific needs of different racial/ethnic groups (Embassy of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United States 2011, 2).  The Census was 
also a main point of discussion in the interviews I conducted. The leaders 
explained that this reformation will allow for key social questions to be answered 
including how many Afro-Venezuelans there are, where they live, their living 
conditions, and their public opinion among other vital statistics.  The officials 
continued to repeat how important it is for the Afro-Venezuelan population to 
know these questions and to be able to demonstrate the answers to the 
government in order to petition for the developmental needs within these 
communities.   
Additionally, legislative reforms have taken place including the Law 
against Racial Discrimination, the recognition of intercultural education in the 
1999 Constitution, and a Presidential Decree that established the Presidential 
Commission for the Prevention and Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in the Venezuelan Educational System. Additionally, a significant 
reform for the Afro-Venezuelan population includes a government initiative to 
establish multiculturalism in the popular culture of Venezuela.  All of these 
26 
 
racially-oriented policies have led to Afro-Venezuelans to support Chávez as 
president.  Due to efforts of the Chávez administration and key movements such 
as the Afro-Venezuelan Network, constitutional and social inclusion has begun 
to take place for the Afro-Venezuelan population.   
The new law of equal education includes for the first time the recognition 
of afro-descendants.  The Organic Law of Education states for the first time that 
the Venezuelan identity includes those who are Afro-Venezuelan including the 
idea that “the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of peoples, with 
the values of local identity, regional, national, with an indigenous vision, Afro, 
Latin American, Caribbean, and universal” (Organic Law of Education 2009, 18). 
 
The Intersection of Class and Race  
In addition, Chávez’s policies that are targeted at wealth redistribution and 
the nationalization of the country’s resources have appealed to the Afro-
Venezuelan population due to their history of being the underclass.  The 
president stated in his 2005 speech to the United Nations that: “open 
market policies were and continue to be ... the fundamental cause of the great 
evils and the great tragedies currently suffered by the Third World” (Chávez 
2005). In contrast to these policies, he noted the accomplishments of his social 
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welfare programs: “One million four hundred and six thousand Venezuelans 
learned to read and write. We are 25 million total … And three million 
Venezuelans, who had always been excluded because of poverty, are now part of 
primary, secondary and higher studies” (Chávez 2005).  In addition to this, there 
are now 12 million people who have access to food at a subsidized price (Chávez 
2005). 
National social welfare programs called Bolivarian Missions have been 
employed by the government.  These missions include social programs that are 
specifically aimed at providing assistance to marginalized populations. It is 
estimated that in 2006 out of a $40.5 billion dollar budget, 41% was dedicated to 
these social programs and social spending increased by three times what it was 
before Chávez became president (Cannon 2008, 24).   
According to Venezuela’s Ministerio del Poder Popular para la 
Comunicación y la Información, the Chávez government has made profound 
macroeconomic transformations that have benefited those that are more likely to 
be socially and economically disadvantaged.  For example, since the creation of 
Misiones Socialistas in 2003 the level of poverty according to income was 
reduced from 62.1% in 2003 to 28.5% in 2009, and the rate of extreme poverty 
was reduced from 29.8% in 2003 to 7.2% in 2009.  According to the Ministry of 
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Popular Power of Communication and Information the National Index of 
Human Development has also increased due to the government’s politics of 
social inclusion and due to the significant increase in the level of income among 
those that are poor.  The National Index of Human Development calculates three 
factors including life expectancy at birth, the mean years of schooling and 
expected years of schooling, and also the standard of living which is measured 
by the gross domestic product at purchasing power parity.  The level of human 
development in Venezuela has increased from 74% in 1990 to 84% in 2009 














Relationship between Being Afro-Venezuelan and Support for Chávez  
A number of sources have suggested large numbers of Afro-descendants and 
Indigenous peoples have voted for Chávez.  According to the Afro-Venezuelan 
Network: 
80 percent of Afro-Venezuelans voted for Chávez in the presidential election and 
in the August 15, 2004 referendum, and in the October 31, 2004 regional 
elections.  The majority of the states where Afro-Descendants live Chávez’s 
candidates won including 40 mayoral positions in 11 states (Colectivo Red 
Afrovenezolana n.d.,33).   
 
Also, many media outlets suggest that Venezuelan society has been sharply 
polarized and divided between the largely wealthy and middle-class opposition 
movement whose members tend to be of European ancestry, and the president’s 
followers, who are largely poor and dark-skinned” (Cannon 2008, 34).  These 
studies do not typically present data to buttress their findings, however. 
The survey data that I utilized to explore this question is the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project conducted in 2007.   Questions about 
respondents’ presidential vote in the 2006 elections and also specific questions 
about their race/ethnicity were included in this survey.  In the cross-tabulation 
below I include the response for vote for president in the last election, and 
whether the person identifies themselves as white, mestiza, indigena, negra 
(afrovenezolana), mulata, or other.  I use the term Afro-Venezuelan for both the 
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black and mulatto categories.  Otherwise, the population sample for thesse two 
categories alone would be too small.  The statistics from this survey data 
suggests that Afro-Venezuelans and mulattos were more likely than other 
racial/ethnic groups to vote for Hugo Chávez as President.  Specifically, 86.4% of 
blacks and 87% mulattos voted for Chávez as opposed to 72.5% of whites, 79.5% 
of mestizos, and 70% of indigenous, voted for Chávez as president.  We can see 
that there is in fact a particularly large difference among the rate of support 
between Afro-Venezuelans (blacks and mulattos) versus the self-identified white 
population.  The support for Chávez among self-identified whites is still 
relatively high perhaps in part because post-election surveys tend to exaggerate 
the level of support of the winner. Somewhat surprisingly, those who identify as 
indigenous are less likely than self-identified whites and mestizos to vote for 
Chávez.  However, this may be an artifact of the small sample size of only 20 
respondents.  
Additionally, whites, mestizos, and indigenous are all much more likely 
than Afro-descendants to support the candidate of the opposition, Manuel 
Rosales.  Whites are almost three times as likely to support Manuel Rosales, 
while Afro-Venezuelans and mulattos are three times less likely than whites to 
support Rosales.  More specifically, 23.3% of whites reported voting for Rosales, 
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while only 8.5% of Afro-Venezuelan and mulattos vote for him.  Mestizos were 
almost twice as likely to vote for Rosales, 14.7% of them reported voting for him 
versus the 8.5% of Afro-Venezuelans and mulattos that supported Rosales. 
 
Table 1 
Race and Self-Reported Vote in the 2006 Presidential Elections 
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The 2nd cross-tabulation analyzes the relationship between how citizens rate the 
work that is being done by Chávez, and whether people identify themselves as 
white, mestizo, indigenous, black (Afro-Venezuelan), mulatto, or other.  This 
cross-tabulation demonstrates that indigenous people and Afro-Venezuelans are 
much more likely to approve of Chávez’s performance.  Whereas 54 percent of 
Afro-Venezuelans and a similar percentage of indigenous people rate his 
performance as good or very good, only 43 percent of whites and mestizos do.   
Whites and mestizos, by contrast, were much more likely than indigenous 
and Afro-Venezuelans to have a neutral rating of the president.  Specifically, 43% 
of whites and 41% of mestizos are neutral toward Chávez, while only 28% of 
indigenous people and 34% of Afro-Venezuelans have a neutral opinion of him.  
Whites are twice as likely as Afro-Venezuelans to have a bad opinion of him, but 
mestizos are only slightly more likely than Afro-Venezuelans to have a bad 
opinion of his performance.  Indigenous people, on the other hand, were the least 
likely to rate the work being done by the Chávez government as very bad.  
Overall, most individuals across all racial/ethnic categories either agree that the 



















































































































































*Categories Very Good and Good were combined because I am measuring those who 
generally support him as president.  
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2007 
 
 
Next, I carried out a multivariate analysis of the impact of race on support 
for Hugo Chávez controlling for a variety of other factors that the literature has 
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identified as important. If the variable Afro-Venezuelan is in fact significant 
while controlling for other variables such as class and ideology, then we can 
conclude that Afro-Venezuelans have supported Chávez disproportionately 
compared to other racial/ethnic groups and that race/ethnicity has been a 
significant factor in the electoral support for Chávez as president. 
I use an ordered probit analysis to carry out this test.  The dependent 
variable for this regression is how well individuals think the government is 
doing.  The responses for this variable include: 1) very good 2) good 3) neither 
bad nor good 4) bad 5) very bad.  The main independent variable is whether or 
not an individual identifies as black.  Ideology was measured by whether 
someone was on the left or the right of the ideological spectrum (1 represented 
the far left of the spectrum and 10 represented the far right).  The respondent’s 
level of income, gender, age, and view of the economy are also included in the 
analysis.  I also include a variable measuring whether or not the respondent 
agrees that Venezuela is democratic. The choices include 1) very democratic 2) 









The Determinants of Support for Chávez as President 
(Ordered Probit Analyses) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error Wald DF Sig. 
Black .569 .177 10.404 1 .001 
Gender -.187 .101 3.463 1 .063 
Age .005 .004 2.184 1 .139 
Ideology -.161 .018 71.197 1 .000 
Income -.032 .025 1.565 1 .211 
View of the 
economy 
-.959 .063 232.704 1 .000 
Democracy  -1.073 .066 260.762 1 .000 
  
 
The results indicate that even controlling for a host of variables identified by the 
literature, being Afro-Venezuelan is a significant factor in support for Chávez as 
president.  Afro-Venezuelans are indeed more likely to think that the 
government is doing a good job.  Gender, age, and income, however, are not 
significant in determining support for the president.  Ideology is significant, and 
there is a positive correlation with those being on the left end of the ideological 
spectrum being more likely to support the president.   Those people who have a 
negative view of the economy are less likely to approve of Chávez’s performance 
as president.  Lastly, the democracy variable is negative and significant.  Those 
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people who think that Venezuela Chávez is very democratic are more likely to 






















This study has shown that Afro-Venezuelans are more likely to have voted for 
Chávez and more likely to approve of his performance compared to other 
racial/ethnic groups.  I have argued that Afro-Venezuelans have supported 
Chávez because of his racial/ethnic background, and his racially-oriented 
policies, as well as his class-based policies.  While political elites of the past have 
ignored issues of race and suggested that Venezuela is a racial democracy, 
Chávez has acknowledged that Venezuela has problems of racial inequality and 
discrimination.  Chávez has repeatedly expressed his empathy with the injustice 
that has been committed against non-white populations. Furthermore, his mixed 
racial/ethnic ancestry is one of the primary reasons that Afro-Venezuelans have 
demonstrated a disproportionate amount of electoral support for him as 
president compared to other racial/ethnic groups.  His acknowledgement of 
racial difference and the past political institutions that have led to racial 
inequality has created the level of support he has found among Afro-
Venezuelans.  Not only has he used positive racial rhetoric, he has also 
implemented specific policies that are directed at redressing racial 
discrimination.   Lastly, the historical legacy of economic exclusion of African 
descendants has attracted the population to the redistributive policies of Chávez.  
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Chávez’s policies that are targeted at wealth redistribution and the 
nationalization of the country’s resources have appealed to the Afro-Venezuelan 
population due to their long history of being economically marginalized.  For all 
of these reasons, citizens of African descent in Venezuela have supported Chávez 
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